US security services warn about problematic DMARC configurations
Your DMARC policy should be set to 'quarantine' or 'reject'
Your DMARC policy should be set to 'quarantine' or 'reject'
North Korean hackers have apparently been taking advantage of badly configured and neglected DMARC policies to send spoofed mail. In particular, they've been posing as journalists, academics and experts in Korean and wider East Asian affairs to send spear phishing messages. All with the aim of gathering information about geopolitical developments, the national security strategies of enemy powers, and other things that could impact North Korean interests.
America's FBI and NSA have therefore published a joint advisory on configuring DMARC securely. And the 2 organisations' advice is just as valid in the Netherlands as it is in the US.
The Netherlands is a geo-economic target for state actors because of its semiconductor manufacturing capability and knowhow, its quantum technology and post-quantum cryptography, and its industrial strength in the defence, aerospace and maritime sectors. The country is also of geopolitical interest because it hosts various international organisations, it's used as a transit port for military equipment en route to Ukraine and NATO's eastern border, and it serves as the landing point for many undersea cables and pipelines.
The problem that the FBI and NSA flag up is that it's common for DMARC to be enabled, but with the policy set to 'none'. If you configure DMARC that way, you're saying that all mail that claims to come from your domain should be allowed through, even if it fails the DMARC validation check. DMARC-enabled domains with their policy set to 'none' are typically a hangover from when the SPF, DKIM and DMARC security standards were implemented: the advice is to initially set the policy to 'none' so that mail doesn't go astray if you've made a configuration error.
However, the idea is, of course, that once you're sure that DMARC is working properly, you change the policy to 'quarantine' or 'reject', so that unvalidated mail is either quarantined (e.g. sent to a spam box) or discarded. In practice, a lot of people forget to make the policy change. They leave the policy as 'none', thus explicitly telling recipients to let mail through, even if validation has failed. There are also domains that have SPF and DKIM configured, but don't have a DMARC policy at all, even though configuring a policy is just a question of publishing a special DNS record.
The FBI and NSA therefore recommend checking your domain's DMARC policy to make sure that it's correctly configured. You can easily do that yourself using the mail test on the Internet.nl portal.
If you haven't yet enabled SPF, DKIM and DMARC on your domain, we advise taking a look at our page about e-mail security. You'll find lots of helpful information and resources there, including detailed guides to implementation in Exim and Postfix.