Rogue Whois servers are a big security risk
Cancelled domain names are liable to be abused
Cancelled domain names are liable to be abused
Last month, ICANN issued a warning about cybercriminals operating 'rogue' Whois servers. The warning made uncomfortable reading for the industry, because the scam flagged up by ICANN relied on domain names previously used for legitimate Whois servers, then allowed to lapse. If snapped up by scammers, such domain names can be used to mimic legitimate Whois servers, in order to hack users or steal their identities.
A Whois server is a database in which domain registration data is stored and made available to the public. Internet users can then look up registration data about domain names, such as registrants' contact details. That kind of information is important to organisations that issue TLS certificates, transfer domain names or send notice-and-take-down requests, for example. Until recently, all registries for generic top-level domains were obliged to operate Whois servers.
Since last year, however, any registry that operates an RDAP service is no longer required to offer Whois as well. When the rules changed, many registries retired their Whois servers, often as a cost-saving measure. In some cases, the domain names previously used for the servers were cancelled as well. And it now seems that the dropped domain names can be re-registered and used for rogue Whois servers, i.e. malicious servers for legitimate domains. A rogue server enables a crook to do things such as obtain fraudulent SSL certificates for phishing sites.
Security expert Benjamin Harris demonstrated the danger last year by registering the lapsed domain name dotmobiregistry.net, previously used for the authoritative Whois server for .mobi domains. After setting up his own Whois server and populating it with false information, he managed to issue false HTTPS certificates, intercept communications and imitate legitimate websites. It was Harris's investigation that prompted ICANN to issue its warning.
The uncomfortable aspect of the disclosures is that Harris exploited a vulnerability that would never have existed if the defunct server's domain name had simply been retained. The risks associated with cancelling sensitive domain names should be known to a registry better than to anyone. We have often highlighted the risks ourselves. It's also striking how many registrars and certificate authorities (CAs) automatically went on trying to query the Whois server after it had been taken down. They too should have noticed that something was amiss much sooner.
The issue of rogue Whois servers shows again that there's still a lot of room for improvement where domain name data and the associated processes are concerned. Whois is an aging protocol, which cannot offer the kind of structured access to domain name information provided by the RDAP protocol. With RDAP, the results of a domain name look-up are reported in JSON format, making them is easy to process. Although RDAP can't prevent human errors, such as cancelling the domain previously used for a trusted service, it does support authentication and access control. Here at SIDN, we began by introducing RDAP for the .amsterdam and .politie extensions. And, since April 2024, we've offered an RDAP service for .nl as well. Users can look up details of a domain name by generating an RDAP URL with '/domain' or '/domeinnaam' followed by the domain name in question, e.g. https://rdap.sidn.nl/domain/sidn.nl.
Because the Whois era is approaching its end, we would advise everyone to migrate to RDAP. We're continuing to operate our Whois services for now, but they'll ultimately be decommissioned.
Finally, a word of important advice: never let an important domain name's registration lapse, even if the name's no longer used for any active services. The security risk is simply too great!