IANA to publish current DNSSEC algorithm recommendations centrally in future
Change should mean clear references and faster updates
Change should mean clear references and faster updates
Recommendations regarding the cryptographic algorithms used under the DNSSEC protocol are going to be moved from the RFCs to the IANA register. A proposal to that effect will shortly itself be published as an RFC.
The main reason for the change is that it'll make it easier to refer to the most recent recommendations. It'll also speed up the process of updating recommendations.
Until now, recommendations regarding the use, support and implementation of cryptographic DNSSEC algorithms have been published within RFCs. The most recent official recommendations are contained in RFC 8624, which was discussed in some detail in a previous article of ours.
An update to RFC 8624 is being prepared, which will advise the phase-out of all DNSSEC algorithms based on the deprecated SHA-1 hash function.
The latest proposal (currently still known by its working title 'rfc8624 bis') is to remove such recommendations from the RFCs and include them in the IANA register instead. The recommendations in question are ones like those made in sections 3.1 (DNSKEY algorithms) and 3.2 (DS algorithms) of RFC 8624. Under the proposal, the 2 tables in those sections will be transferred to the IANA register.
At the moment, the DNSSEC tables administered by IANA [DNSKEY, DS] are little more than lists of numbers, names and statuses (the latter for DS algorithms only). Under the proposed arrangement, the recommendations contained in the RFC tables will be added to the tables in the IANA register. Future RFCs (and other documents) can then always refer to the IANA tables as the source of the most recent advice.
Any future updates to the recommendations would still be published as RFCs, but also incorporated into the IANA tables. Typically, the recommendations are updated every few years, as existing algorithms become 'deprecated' (i.e. deemed unsuitable because they are outdated or insecure), and as new algorithms are added [1].
After all, the purpose of the recommendations is of course to ensure that domain name registrants and authoritative name server operators make use of the most secure and efficient algorithms (according to the latest, albeit conservative insights), and that validating resolvers also support the algorithms actually in use (for reasons of interoperability). In turn, software-builders need to see to it that deprecated and insecure algorithms are phased out (as soon as market circumstances allow), and that new algorithms are made available to users promptly.
However, the form and content of the tables in the IANA register are quite formally regulated. Under 'rfc8624 bis', the following columns will be added to the existing tables:
DNSKEY algorithms:
Use for DNSSEC Signing
Use for DNSSEC Validation
Implement for DNSSEC Signing
Implement for DNSSEC Validation
DS algorithms:
Use for DNSSEC Delegation
Use for DNSSEC Validation
Implement for DNSSEC Delegation
Implement for DNSSEC Validation
The first 2 columns are intended for domain name registrants/operators and DNS service providers, respectively. The latter 2 columns are intended for the developers of, respectively, authoritative name servers and validating resolvers.
The recommendations themselves will be allowed to use the values 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY' and 'OPTIONAL'. The formal meanings of those values are defined in RFC 2119.
The latest, complete tables that under the proposals would be transferred to the IANA register are contained in sections 3 and 4 of 'rfc8624 bis'. The practical implication for domain name registrants/operators is that algorithm 8, algorithm 13 and algorithm 15 can in principle be used for DNSKEYs. However, we recommend that everyone should use algorithm 13, as we ourselves do in the .nl zone.
Only algorithm 2 is still recommended for DS use. However, .nl domain name registrants/operators don't have to concern themselves with that because we only require a DNSKEY record to be provided, not a DS record. We have always generated DS records ourselves using algorithm 2, from the DNSKEY records provided to us.
For more information about the various algorithms and recommendations, see our DNSSEC FAQs.